Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-1: Strategy

Key Concepts

Matching the strategy to the objective

“If the political objective is unlimited, the military strategy must be unlimited. ...Though our political objective is limited, it does not necessarily follow that our military strategy must also be limited (see figure).” (p. 2-21)

Defense is easier than offense

“Friction and inertia are normally on the side of the defender as well: it is inherently easier to hold onto something than to take it away from someone else.” (p. 3-4)

Pitfall: Strategic Panaceas

“Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescriptions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic panacea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and universal solution.” (p. 4-18)

Pitfall: Emphasizing Process Over Product

“Just as there is no strategic panacea, there is no optimal strategy-making process.” (p. 4-19)

“However, when the entire process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.” (p. 4-19)

Pitfall: The Fait Accompli

“The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat and clean—even “surgical.” The danger is that many attempted faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment.” (p. 4-20)

Pitfall: Paralysis and Recklessness

“Strategy makers almost always have to plan and act in the absence of complete information or without a full comprehension of the situation.” (p. 4-23)

“Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.” (p. 4-23)

Quotables

“Hence, to describe war as an “instrument of policy” is entirely correct. It is an act of force to compel our opponent to do our will. Do not, however, confuse rationality with intelligence, reasonableness, or understanding. Policies can be wise or foolish: they can advance their creators’ goals or unwittingly contradict them.” (p. 1-6) 

“To survive over time, the various members of any ecosystem must adapt—not only to the external environment, but to each other. These agents compete or cooperate, consume and are consumed, join and divide, and so on. A system created by such interaction is called a complex adaptive system.” (p. 1-11)

“The military strategy is not developed in isolation from the other instruments of national power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compatible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives and strategies.” (p. 2-7)

“However, there are only two fundamental ends behind the use of military force. The first is to physically overpower the enemy’s military capacity, leaving the enemy unable to resist our demands. The other is to inflict such high costs on the enemy that negotiations on our terms becomes a favorable option.” (pp. 2-18-19)

“There are only two fundamental national strategic goals in any conflict: survival and victory.” (p. 2-7)

“A major problem with victory as a goal is that victory is an emotion-laden word. The accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not satisfy the emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not feel like victory.” (p. 2-9)

“In many important respects, defense is inherently stronger than offense. The strength of the strategic defense derives from human psychology and the balance of power mechanism as well as the forces of friction and inertia.” (p. 3-3-4)

“In fact, strategy is very seldom if ever made in a fully rational way.” (p. 4-3)

“...without a basic understanding of the situation, decisionmaking and action are likely to be seriously flawed.” (p. 4-4) 

“Successful military strategies select a military goal or goals that secure the desired political objectives, not something else.” (p. 4-8)

“The effective strategist must be prepared to demonstrate to all sides why the defended cause meets the criteria of just war theory and why the enemy’s cause does not. If a legitimate and effective argument on this basis cannot be assembled, then it is likely that both the cause and the strategy are fatally flawed.” (p. 4-17)

“Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.” (p. 4-23)